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ABSTRACT: Climate scientists today face hostile public challenges to their epistemic authority and integrity. 
Historian Spencer Weart calls the situation “unprecedented.” This talk explores a precedent of sorts: the general 
intellectual crisis of the seventeenth century, out of which modern scientific institutions and norms emerged. How 
was the intellectual atmosphere at the time similar (and different)? What factors allowed a civil, productive, 
authoritative scientific discourse to emerge, and can we draw any heuristic lessons that are applicable today? 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Today climate science is an unusually difficult field to work in. Not only is it depressing to 
carry a message of gloom and doom, but the epistemic authority and integrity of the climate 
science community is challenged or rejected by a significant portion of the public. Scientists 
who enter the field know that their senior colleagues have been subject to verbal attacks, email 
hacks, and political show trials. It is a situation that is psychologically toxic and could have an 
adverse impact on the quality of work performed or the ability of the discipline to recruit 
young talent (or, arguably, on the type of individual who self-selects into the profession). The 
dean of historians of climate science, Spencer Weart (2012), has remarked that it is 
“unprecedented in world history, that an entire scientific community has come under suspicion 
and is being widely criticized as being self-concerned, fraudulent” (emphasis added).  
The dysfunctional situation of climate scientists today may in fact be unprecedented in 
the history of modern science, but in this paper I intend to explore a precedent of sorts, in the 
general European intellectual crisis of the seventeenth century that gave rise to modern science. 
There are of course many significant differences, but I believe that the similarities are 
significant enough that the parallel is worth exploring.  
One of the goals of this comparison is to see if there are any useful lessons from the 
seventeenth century about how a body of scholars can extricate themselves from such a toxic 
situation. As it happens, we have a wealth of excellent recent scholarship on the emergence of 
modern science in the seventeenth century. This essay will draw from that scholarship, reading 
it less as an “origins” story of how modern science came into being than as an “exodus” story 
of how the crisis was overcome. 
2. THE GENERAL INTELLECTUAL CRISIS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
The seventeenth century was an era of political and religious upheaval. Catholics, Lutherans, 
and Calvinists quarreled and persecuted each other and minority sects. It was an era of 
seemingly
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seemingly interminable warfare, including the Thirty Year’s War and the English Civil War, 
both of which were fought to some extent along religious lines. According to Geoffrey Parker 
(2013, ch. 2), there were only three years completely free of interstate warfare in Europe in the 
entire century. “In the six decades between 1618 and 1678, Poland was at peace for only 27 
years, the Dutch Republic for only 14, France for only 11, and Spain for only 3.” Many regions 
of Germany lost over 30% of their population, and some suffered depopulation of more than 
50%.  
Economic historian Eric Hobsbawm (1954) coined the term “General Crisis” to 
describe this era, and Hugh Trevor-Roper (1959) extended the thesis, describing a generalized 
period of social, political, and religious upheaval. While some (e.g., Rabb, 1976; Parker and 
Smith, 1997) have continued in the vein of social, political, and economic/demographic 
analysis, others (e.g., Toulmin, 1990; Parker, 2001; Parker, 2013) have extended the scope of 
inquiry further, delving into the intellectual dimension of the General Crisis. 
As we will explore in some detail below, intellectual life during this period was 
unusually contentious. Aristotelian philosophy was the foundation of the university system, but 
it was treated formulaically. It could not easily be reformed, and it could not easily 
be dislodged, both for institutional reasons and because it provided the basic intellectual 
furniture of every educated person. Scholars outside the academy were increasingly eager 
to throw Aristotelian methods and doctrines overboard, but there was no consensus about 
what could replace them. Numerous “schools” arose, and they thrived on attacking 
each other. A contemporary observer, Jan Amos Komenský (Comenius, 1631 [1942], pp. 
41-42), wrote that philosophers “act like rustics in a tavern; they all howl, and each one to a 
different tune.” In his allegorical tale, The Labyrinth of the World and the Paradise of the 
Heart, Comenius captured the turbulent spirit of contemporary intellectual life.
There were wrangles, quarrels, frays, and tumult . . . . He was a rare man indeed who had no 
contention with someone else. . . . In fact, the more learned anyone considered himself or was 
considered by others, the more disputations he stirred up and the more he attacked his neighbors with 
fencing, slashing, striking, and shooting, til it was fearful to behold. It is true that their weapons did 
not appear terrible at first sight, . . . But when I saw how one who had been but slightly hit jerked, 
shrieked, writhed and fled, I easily understood that this was no jest but a real fight. 
3. THE DYSFUNCTION
In general outline, we have established that the seventeenth century was a difficult time to be a 
scholar on account of a challenging social environment. We can get more specific about some 
of the features of this environment, and see specific parallels with the situation of climate 
scientists today: 
(A) Communication by inexpensive new mass media that permitted anonymity, fostering
prolific uncivil dialogue
The seventeenth century was the era of the pamphlet and the abusive pamphlet war (Raymond, 
2006; Parker, 2013, pp. 570-571).) Pamphleteers could reach mass literate audiences 
at minimal cost, and were frequently published under pseudonyms. The result was 
an  orgy of unrestrained libel and propaganda.  Personal attacks were common.  John  Locke,
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looking back on the English Civil War, accused “the pens of Englishmen of as much guilt as 
their swords, judging that the issue of blood from whence such an inundation hath flowed had 
scarce been opened, or at least not so long unstopped had men been more unsparing with their 
ink” (quoted in Parker, 2013, p. 572). 
In the sphere of learning, this was an era where Copernicus delayed publication until he 
was on his deathbed because he didn’t want to be subjected to the storm of abuse that he 
expected his heliocentric theory to provoke (Rosen, 2008, p. 396). Descartes was another who 
shrank from the pamphlet wars—he retired to the Netherlands and refused to engage his 
opponents, allowing his disciples to publicly defend his work. 
Others such as Galileo thrived on the verbal jousting (Biagioli, 1993). In the end, of 
course, Galileo misplayed his hand, calling down the wrath of the Vatican upon himself with a 
provocative publication. 
Today, we again face a proliferation of uncivil dialogue thanks to new media that are 
inexpensive and permit anonymity: blogging and other electronic media. Some climate 
scientists, like Michael Mann and Gavin Schmidt of RealClimate.org, have become savvy in 
defending themselves and even going on the offensive in the blogosphere; others, like the 
University of East Anglia scientists blindsided by the ClimateGate affair, have been its hapless 
victims. 
(B) High stakes
In the seventeenth century philosophical disputes were bound up with religious and political 
disputes. Reaching back into the late sixteenth century: Petrus Ramus excited great hatred for 
his attacks on Aristotle and for his Protestant faith, and was targeted for murder—possibly by a
University of Paris colleague—in the general French purge of Protestants in 1572.
Tommaso Campanella, Giordano Bruno, and Galileo Galilei are examples of philosophers 
who were punished by the authority of the Church (confined in 1592, executed in 1600, and 
confined in 1634, respectively) for unorthodox views. Descartes (who, ironically, left France 
to be out of the reach of the Catholic Church) and his disciples in the Netherlands were 
persecuted by establishment Calvinists as alleged promoters of atheism starting in the 1640s. 
Baruch Spinoza, an atheistic philosopher and admirer of Descartes, was attacked by a knife-
wielding assassin and subsequently excommunicated by the Jewish community in Amsterdam; 
he left the city in 1661 under threat of expulsion. The Calvinist Johann Heinrich Alsted labored 
over his massive 1630 Encyclopedia not simply for love of knowledge, but to bolster a 
Reformed orthodoxy and to support programs of mass literacy and cultural mobilization 
for Calvinist states in danger of being swallowed up by Lutheran and Catholic neighbors 
(Hotson, 2000). 
Certain philosophical topics were particularly provocative. Divergent interpretations of 
the Aristotelian doctrine of substance and accidents in natural philosophy were 
intimately bound up in the debates about the nature of the eucharist that raged among 
Lutherans, Calvinists, and Catholics (Garish, 2005). Challenges to Aristotelian and Ptolemaic 
orthodoxy could be interpreted not only as challenges to the ancient university establishments, 
but also as defiance of the authority of the Catholic church. 
Today, climate is a high-stakes issue. For climate scientists and climate activists, it 
represents risk of ecological catastrophe and possibly societal catastrophe. For some of their 
most strident opponents, at stake in the climate debates is a risk of tyrannical one-world 
government and the loss of cherished liberties. The heated climate debates have not yet led to 
documented physical violence, but they have reached such a pitch that death threats against 
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scientists are commonplace, and that actors on both sides have proven willing to break the law: 
Scientists and administrators at the University of East Anglia violated the spirit and letter of 
UK Freedom of Information law by refusing to respond to skeptics’ demands for data; 
contrarians violated UK and international law with a sophisticated, premeditated attack on 
UEA’s servers (Ranalli, 2013). 
(C) Clearly demarcated parties in disputes
The first half of the seventeenth century was still an era of masters and followers in 
philosophy, as it had been since the ancient world (Ben-David, 1971). One was an 
“Aristotelian” or a “Ramist” or a “Cartesian” or a “Baconian” or a “Platonist.” In astronomy 
one was a follower of Ptolemy or Copernicus (or Tycho Brahe), in medicine a follower of 
Galen or Paracelsus. Comenius caught the spirit of the times when he wrote in his allegory of 
the “great multitude of those who had disputes among themselves” among the learned, 
including “Aristotle with Plato, Cicero with Sallust, Scotus with Aquinas, Bartolus with 
Baldus, Erasmus with the Sorbonnists, Ramus and Campanella with the Peripatetics, 
Copernicus with Ptolemy, Theophrastus with Galen, . . . and numberless others” (Comenius, 
1631 [1942], 43). 
One did not sit on the sidelines in such conflicts. One participated, representing 
whichever party one had been educated in or converted to. The extraordinary scholar who 
broke the mold did not transcend the conflict, he merely became the founder of a new school 
(as happened to Copernicus, Bacon, Descartes, and Paracelsus), and party lines were drawn 
anew. The ordinary business of a scholar was to attack and defend. “As soon as anyone uttered 
a word,” Comenius wrote in his allegory, “instantly another stood up to oppose him, so that 
wranglings even as to the snow, whether it were white or black, or the fire, whether it were hot 
or cold, abounded.” 
The scholastic educational system perpetuated a conflict-oriented approach to 
scholarship. Examinations consisted of disputation: attacking or defending a given thesis. 
Today, climate science has become a battleground in the culture wars, and many 
participants find it all too easy to step into the role of a partisan, recognizing one group as 
allies and another as enemies. Judith Curry (2009) has described the situation in climate 
science today as one of “tribalism”: When under attack, a community circles the wagons and 
trains the guns outward. It is a very natural, very human response. But as long as one is looking 
to score points against “opponents” and willing to overlook the faults and mistakes of “allies,” 
Curry implies, the pursuit of truth is impeded. 
(D) Incentives to stir up controversy for the entertainment of an audience
It was common in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for intellectuals outside the 
university system to serve in the employment of noble patrons. This made them essentially 
courtiers, and required them to play the courtier’s game of flattery and personal politics. 
Following Mario Biagioli’s analysis of this situation (Biagioli, 1992; Biagioli, 1993): The 
intellectual client serves his patron not only by dedicating works to him, but also be providing 
him with entertainment: provoking sparring matches with other intellectuals, exchanging 
virtual blows with them wittily and provocatively, and slapping them down. Essentially the 
courtier-scientist is a cock in a cockfight. Whatever other motivations he may have for 
exercising his intellectual gifts, he is always exercising them for the idle amusement and 
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entertainment of a courtly audience. The discourse takes on a simultaneously pugilistic and 
sycophantic quality. 
Today, those who engage in the climate science wars in the blogosphere, from 
whatever side, are arguably in a similar role, or vulnerable to being so. If they have some 
standing they have attracted an audience, and whatever other motive they have for participating 
in the climate debates, they are also out to entertain their audience. In many cases, that 
audience wants blood. 
(E) Public and mutual distrust
The Climategate affair called the climate science establishment’s credibility into doubt in the 
eye of the public, and even years after multiple investigators cleared the scientists of anything 
resembling fraud, contrarians retain their suspicions and the general public is susceptible to 
doubt.  
An episode in seventeenth century intellectual life which, although very different in its 
details, produced comparable effects, was the Rosicrucian craze (Yates, 1972).  A pair of 
pamphlets appeared in Germany in 1614 and 1615 and quickly circulated throughout Europe, 
announcing the existence of a “Brotherhood of the Rosy Cross,” an elite secret society 
shrouded in mystery and many-layered symbolism, whose mission was to renew European 
political and religious and intellectual life.  The pamphlets publicly announced that the 
brotherhood was ready to accept new members, but it did not provide an address for 
correspondence. Instead, it instructed interested parties to publicly declare their candidacy in 
pamphlets of their own, and said that the brotherhood would read them and privately contact 
those it wished to induct.  
The Rosicrucian pamphlets caused a stir throughout Europe. There were many who fell 
for the ruse and publicly declared their wish to join the secret society or lend it support, and 
there were many others—including religious and civil authorities—who thought the 
organization represented a threat to established order. Descartes was travelling in Germany 
when the pamphlets came to light, and he enthusiastically but unsuccessfully tried to find the 
authors. When he returned home to Paris, he found that most people assumed he had been 
inducted into the secret society, and for the remainder of this life he had trouble convincing 
both admirers and enemies otherwise. 
Eventually, it came to be generally accepted that the pamphlets had been a hoax, or 
more precisely a ludibrum or joke (though the precise identity of the authors is still in some 
doubt). The upshot was that (a) many intellectuals had been shown to be gullible marks, (b) the
religious and civil authorities had made it clear that they would persecute intellectuals if they 
felt their turf was threatened, and (c) many in the public harbored lingering suspicions that a 
secret cabal of intellectuals was running their world—or would willingly do so if given the 
opportunity. 
4. THE RESOLUTION
How were each of these problems overcome over the course of the seventeenth century? 
(A) Face-to-face communication in place of anonymous media
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An important element of the emergence of modern science, as Steven Shapin and others have 
documented (Shapin and Schaffer, 1985; Shapin, 1994), was the establishment of scientific 
societies that met regularly in person to discuss scientific topics and conduct experiments. 
Face-to-face meetings and collective witnessing of experiments facilitated the formation of 
consensus where consensus was possible and civil disagreement where it was not. The 
pamphlet did not disappear in this world of face-to-face scientific meetings, but new literary 
media rose to prominence in scientific discourse: personal letters that bound together the 
international scientific network in bonds of friendship and collegiality, and scientific journals 
that were lavishly illustrated, providing a simulacrum of collective witnessing for the reader. 
(B) Modest goals, lower stakes
As the religious wars receded late in the seventeenth century, religious questions became less 
politically charged and philosophical research became less religiously contentious. At the same 
time, natural philosophers began to be more modest and circumspect in their aims and their 
assertions, in part to emphasize to religious and civil authorities the innocuous and non-
threatening nature of their work. English natural philosophers began to distinguish matters of 
fact, around which they believed consensus could be established reliably, from 
hypotheses about causes, where science could not provide definite answers (e.g., Shapin 
and Shaffer, 1985; Shapin, 1994; Shapiro, 2000). They “lowered [the] standards for 
proof” in natural philosophy, demanding only “moral certainty” rather than mathematical 
certainty (Daston 1991, p. 346). French rationalists attempted to compartmentalize the 
study of bodies, res extensa, in an arena of discourse separate from matters of the soul where 
the Church exercised dominion about acceptable belief.  
(C) Post-partisan discourse
The informal scientific discussion groups that met in England during the Civil War and 
Interregnum years included members representing a variety of religious affiliations 
and political loyalties. These groups served as a safe space where members could escape 
the wider social turmoil and focus on scientific topics. When the Royal Society of London 
was founded, the precedents set by the earlier groups were followed: religious and political 
topics were excluded from discussion.  
The English-led focus on witnessing experiments and establishing matters of fact 
undercut philosophical partisanship (Shapiro, 1968; Daston, 1991; Shapiro, 2000). The 
business of the scientist was no longer to propound and defend and attack theories, but to 
collect, certify, and systematize matters of fact. If Aristotle, Plato, Zeno, and Epicurus, the 
founders of rival schools, had left posterity with records of observation rather than bodies of 
doctrine, Thomas Sprat wrote in his History of the Royal Society, they would have done 
posterity a greater service—such was the aim of the founders of the Royal Society (Sprat 1667,
p. 117). Though the Society pursued a research agenda similar to that prescribed by Francis
Bacon, there was no room for doctrinal “Baconianism” any more than for doctrinal
Aristotelianism, Platonism, or Cartesianism.
(D) Peer-orientation rather than patron-orientation
In Galileo’s day, the center of gravity of European science was in Italy. By the end of the 
century, it had shifted to England. Differences in the social customs and political structure of 
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two nations arguably played a role in the emergence of modern science. In the absence of a 
strong court culture in Restoration England, scientists were compelled to submit their findings 
to each other, as peers, for approval and certification rather than to a patron (Biagioli, 1992; 
Henry, 1992). This encouraged—required—collegiality. 
(E) Seeking and earning public trust
Natural philosophers worked hard to convince authorities and the public that their work was 
non-threatening and even publicly useful. They made a show of NOT being esoteric: using 
plain language and openly sharing findings and methods so others could replicate their work. 
The Royal Society met privately but not secretly. Guests were frequently present; scholars 
from foreign lands were especially welcome. Members were overwhelmingly gentlemen, but 
precedents were established that anyone of any station who had something of value to 
communicate would be admitted.  
Descartes and others sought to set natural philosophy on a mechanical footing in part to 
eliminate action-at-a-distance, and thus remove any putative association with natural magic or 
other esoteric doctrines. 
Although they did not have a lot to show for it at the end of the seventeenth century in 
terms of practical applications, the English scientists wrapped themselves in the mantle of 
Baconian utilitarianism and insisted that their philosophical investigations would be of benefit 
to society. The Royal Society’s apologists Thomas Sprat (1667) and Joseph Glanvill (1668) 
painstakingly rebutted possible arguments that what the scientists were doing was dangerous to 
peace or piety. 
5. LESSONS?
What does this tell us about prospects for improving the situation of climate science today? 
The usual caveats about learning lessons from history apply here: Similarities should 
not blind us to innumerable differences. Historical comparisons do not offer a sound basis for 
predictions. At best they can suggest possibilities and highlight factors that might be useful to 
consider. With that in mind, I propose that the parallels listed above suggest the following 
possible ways forward in the current climate science quagmire, and/or insights into conditions 
that would be conducive to improved outcomes.  
(A) Choice of media: Movement away from blogging, toward more personal and interactive
media for communicating about and debating science, would probably be beneficial.
This does not necessarily mean a retreat from electronic media. Even
videoconferencing, which reintroduces body language and (if done right) eye contact,
can humanize antagonists. (See, for an interesting example, West and McDonnell,
2013.)
(B) Lowering the stakes: Climate problems are likely to only get worse as the current
century progresses; in that regard it is difficult to imagine how the stakes of the
debate might be lowered. However, as the public discourse increasingly shifts from
mitigation to adaptation/preparedness, there is a distinct possibility that dialogue will
become less ideologically charged and more productive (Weber, 2013).
(C) Post-partisan discourse. In the United States, climate science is caught up in the culture
wars. Conservative leaders have the power to remedy that situation by shifting the
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terms of the debate from science to policy. Some are already doing this: for example, 
the R Street Institute (a spin-off of the Heartland Institute) and Bob Inglis’s Energy and 
Enterprise Institute are two organizations that seek to promote climate change 
mitigation policies based on consensus science and conservative (free-market and fiscal 
conservative) values. 
(D) Peer orientation rather than patron/audience orientation? Climate science will always
be funded by governments, but perhaps climate scientists would have more credibility
with the public if there was more distance between themselves and policy makers than
is currently the case under the current IPCC regime. At the same time, one wonders if
there is a way that bloggers and other science communicators could be made more
responsive to each other and to shared professional standards, and away from the
culture of blood sport that a partisan readership encourages. Perhaps (a) conferences,
(b) peer-driven awards or other tokens of mutual appreciation, or (c) a support group
could create more of a sense of solidarity among bloggers.
(E) Transparency. In wake of Climategate, scientists have learned that they gain more by
complete transparency than they do by withholding data from critics. Climategate
taught that personal credibility matters, not just the rigor of published analyses (Ranalli,
2012).
One important difference between then and now is that the seventeenth-century crisis, for the 
most part, was a crisis among an intellectual elite seeking to establish a modus vivendi among 
themselves. That modus vivendi worked well for centuries. Today’s crisis concerns a 
broadening of the circle of epistemic competence. There has been talk of an emerging new era 
of democratized science—e.g., crowd-sourced data gathering and more “open” forms of peer 
review (see, for example, Jerry Ravetz (2010a; 2010b) on the “extended peer community”). 
Whether or not those particular ideas have merit, it seems to me that one of the outcomes of 
today’s climate science debates, if conditions allow, may be a renewed and broadened 
commitment to a modus vivendi of civility, transparency, and epistemic humility. 
Paolo Rossi (1991, p. 272ff) has argued that one of the distinct features of the scientific 
revolution of the seventeenth century was a spirit of democratization of knowledge. This was 
manifested in “people’s passion for opening schools,” in the words of Comenius (cited in 
Rossi, 1991, p. 273), and practical efforts to diffuse knowledge. It was also manifested in the 
epistemic foundations that scientific revolutionaries laid under their edifices. Both empiricists 
and rationalists appealed to universal epistemic standards and ordinary human faculties to 
justify their methods and support their conclusions. Descartes, for example, wrote that “good 
sense is the best distributed thing in the world . . . The diversity of our opinions [do not arise] 
because some of us are more reasonable than others [but] because we direct our thoughts along 
different paths and do not attend to the same things” (cited in Rossi, 1991, pp. 273-74).) There 
is a political dimension to this, as Rossi acknowledges: it was the intellectual elite of the war-
torn continent saying we are all alike, what is essential we have in common, where “we” was 
understood as broadly inclusive; it was an appeal to human dignity. Bacon, in a similar vein, 
wrote that we should “strip ourselves of our character of learned men and try to become 
common men” (cited in Rossi, 1991, 279). Rossi (1991, p. 274) observes that this “thesis of 
equality of intelligence in the face of scientific truth” was paralleled by developments in civil
and international legal theory that prefigured the universalism of the Enlightenment. 
Two examples of how elitism was diminished: First, whereas for centuries getting an 
education meant learning Latin as a new “father” language and undergoing other formal 
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university training that set one apart from ordinary society that relies on the mother tongue, in 
the seventeenth century scholarship took deep root outside the universities, in a non-
hierarchical network of scholars with no formal membership criteria, and these scholars started 
publishing in earnest in vernacular languages. Second, interest in the esoteric traditions, while 
it continued in the seventeenth century, was transformed: those traditions were valued less for 
the elite status they purported to convey, and more for the secrets of nature they could 
contribute. Alsted, Comenius, Descartes, and Robert Boyle all had some association with 
esoteric traditions, and all, to the extent they drew on those traditions, did so in the service of 
public and universal knowledge in a way that would have been unthinkable to adepts in 
previous centuries. 
Over the centuries that trend has continued: knowledge has become ever more 
democratized, and in the Internet age that democratization has been taken to unprecedented 
extremes. Virtually unlimited data and information and even certain types of technical training 
have become available to anyone with time to invest. At the same time, over the course of 
centuries scientific knowledge has become so advanced and specialized that the cutting edge 
has become obscured, newly esoteric. The climate wars are partly about that gap between 
advancing democratic aspirations and a receding horizon of competent specialized expertise, a 
gap that is sometimes exaggerated by experts and sometimes appears foreshortened because of 
the leveling aspect of the Internet. The advance of science frontiers will not stop, nor should 
we wish it to. One positive way forward, it would seem, is more and better democratization. 
We have seen that, to an extent, already: As climate skeptics with scientific aspirations spend 
more time with the topic, the difference between their views and that of the IPCC diminishes 
(seen for example in the evolution of the semi-skeptical Berkeley Earth Project and the views 
of some skeptical bloggers), even as they continue to press increasingly nuanced objections. 
One wonders whether it might be beneficial to make graduate-level education in climate 
science available to representatives of the skeptical community, so they can articulate whatever 
legitimate scientific concerns skeptics have in ways that will improve the science, and so they 
can speak with authority and credibility about climate problems to that segment of the lay 
public that is unmoved by the testimony of the likes of Al Gore or James Hanson.  
Thus even a key difference between then and now (an elite problem then, a public 
problem now) suggests lessons. 
There is one final curious connection between the crisis of the seventeenth century and 
the climate debates of today: a growing body of evidence points to climate change as a 
significant factor in catalyzing the General Crisis of the seventeenth century. Geoffrey Parker 
(2013) has catalogued the ways in which poor harvests caused by colder temperatures 
exacerbated social and political unrest. The extraordinary cold also sparked curiosity among 
the literate about how unique their own era was, and spurred them to start keeping careful 
weather records and to scour history books and local registers for weather documentation from 
earlier centuries. These compilations form the basis of the historical temperature record upon 
which modern climate science is in part built. Thus climate change in the seventeenth century 
both spurred divisive conflict (out of which an intelligentsia prizing tolerance, dispassion, 
and epistemic modesty emerged in pained reaction), and inspired valuable scientific 
investigation. In our own century, we can fully expect that every aspect of social, political, and 
cultural life, including intellectual life, is likely to be affected in one way or another by climate 
change. We can do no better than speculate, but it is intriguing to consider how climate change 
might affect the direction and quality of twenty-first century intellectual discourse. 
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